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Abstract 
 
 
The present study examines the relationship between openness (trade-GDP ratio) and 
growth. Our cross-country panel data analysis of a sample 51 countries of the South 
during 1981-2002 shows that for only 11 rich and highly trade-dependent countries a 
higher real growth is associated with a higher trade share. Time series study of individual 
country experiences shows that the majority of the countries covered in the sample 
including the East Asian countries experienced no positive long-term relationship 
between openness and growth during 1961-2002. Our study of the experience of various 
regions and groups shows that only the Middle Income group exhibited a positive long-
term relationship.  
 
JEL Codes: F43, F02, O50. 
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Is  there any link between trade openness and growth? The present study seeks to answer 
this question.  As an introduction to our study we start with a discussion of the process of 
evolution from the Ricardian policy prescription of free trade to ‘Washington Consensus’ 
(WC) along with almost parallel development of the idea of economic nationalism and 
their link with colonization and catching-up debate (Section 1). Then we survey some of 
the existing theoretical and empirical works in this field (Section 2).  Subsequently we 
present our empirical findings based on both panel data and time-series analysis (Sections 
3 and 4). The summary and concluding observations are presented in the last section 
(Section 5).  
 
1. Ricardian Free Trade Doctrine and Neo-liberal ‘Washington Consensus’ vis-à-vis 
Economic Nationalism 
 
The old Ricardian dictum of international division of labour according to comparative 
advantages provided the academic support to the nineteenth century pattern of free trade 
between colonies/semi-colonies and their ruling countries. The classical writers believed 
that the operation of the two laws of return - the law of diminishing returns in primary 
production and the law of increasing returns in manufactures - in a free and competitive 
market-economy world would lead to an improvement in the terms of trade of the 
primary-producing countries. In the process of the free play of international market forces 
these countries would enjoy the fruits of industrial revolution through favourable terms of 
trade. Thus the colonial pattern of trade (free flow of food and raw materials from the 
colonies in exchange of finished manufactures from their ruling countries) in a world of 
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colonisation and conquest (the nineteenth century pattern of globalisation) got its 
legitimacy from the-then ‘mainstream’ economics.  
 
Almost parallel to the free trade ideology (an extension of the natural order and laissez 
faire philosophy) the idea of economic nationalism and infant-industry argument for 
trade restrictions came up not only in the writings of scholars such as Friedrich List but 
also in the policies pursued by the countries that were the late-starters in industrial 
revolution. Their policy makers were clever enough to understand that the free trade 
ideology preached by the British economists and statesmen was actually a part of the 
strategy of ‘ kicking away the ladder’ with which Britain reached the top (for details see 
Chang, 2002).  
 
Guided by economic nationalism the late-starters of industrial revolution developed 
rapidly and were able to catch up with the pioneers. Analysing the industrial development 
of Germany and England, Veblen (1915) pointed out the 'advantages of relative 
backwardness'. Gerschenkron (1952) updated and extended the work of Veblen to 
include Russia, France and Italy. In the process developed the ‘catching-up'/convergence 
hypothesis: the latecomers in industrialization tend to grow faster because learning and 
imitation is typically cheaper and faster than is the original discovery and testing (see also 
Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Gomulka, 1987).   
 
The poor colonies could not catch up as they could not follow the policy of economic 
nationalism (independent of their ruling countries’ national interests). In fact the 
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countries such as India faced de-industrialisation (decline of their artisan activities which 
were much advanced than their European counterpart) in the early stages of industrial 
revolution (see Sarkar, 1992 for details and reference).  Thus the world became divided 
into the industrially developed North (‘Centre’) constituting the countries, which could 
catch up the pioneers (for evidence of catching up see Abramovitz, 1986; see also Sarkar, 
2000) and the industrially backward primary-goods producing South  (raw-material 
supplying ‘Periphery’) constituting the countries which could not catch up.  
 
The orthodox ‘mainstream’ economic theory chose to ignore this history (perhaps their 
proponents all over the whole industrialised world were guided by the same ‘kicking 
away the ladder’ strategy) and continued to show the virtue of free trade in an articulated 
way of characterising a make-believe world (and mesmerised a large number of students 
of economics all over the globe). 
 
However, outside the orbit of orthodox ‘mainstream’ economics exists a large number of 
sensible heterodox scholars who choose not to ignore history, and institutions in 
suggesting a policy prescription to a less developed region. John R Commons is one such 
scholar, a big name in institutional economics (see Lafayette, 1965 for an evaluation of 
his contribution). He provided The Theory of Reasonable Value (Commons, 1934) and 
advocated protectionism from a practical institutional aspect (see Ramstad, 1987 for 
details of this theory).  
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In the post-Second World War Period, Prebisch (1950, 1959, 1964) and Singer (1950) 
from the platform of United Nations and UNCTAD raised their voice against the 
conventional wisdom of free trade and suggested to the newly independent colonies and 
semi-colonies to follow the path of import-substituting industrialisation, ISI (see also 
Myrdal, 1956 for the same policy prescription) and tried to show that the terms of trade 
followed the path opposite to what was postulated by the classical writers.  The Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis generated much controversy (for details see Sarkar, 1986 and 2001). 
But through their direct and indirect influence or guided by economic nationalism 
(independent of the Prebisch-Singer-Myrdal thesis of autarkic development) the national 
governments of the newly independent colonies and semi-colonies and many Latin 
American countries followed the ISI. 
 
In the process of rapid domestic industrialisation under the ISI strategy these countries 
required increased imports of machines and technology and pulled most new resources to 
import-competing activities. It resulted into more rapid growth in the demand for foreign 
exchange that surpassed the growth in export earnings. In the process these countries 
began to face acute balance of payments problems.  This situation demanded increased 
export drive to pay for imports. 
 
Moreover, to finance the balance of payments deficit, these countries became dependent 
on the rich industrially developed countries and international financial institutions such as 
the IMF/World Bank, dominated by the rich developed countries. The distressed 
Southern countries seeking their help are often advised to open up their economy to 
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foreign trade and investment along with many other kinds of structural adjustments (such 
as removal of state controls, reduction of state expenditures, public sector disinvestments 
to make room for private investment etc). All these ‘neo-liberal’ policy prescriptions 
were summed up as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (WC) by John Williamson (an 
economist from the Institute for International Economics, an international economic 
think-tank based in Washington, D.C.). 
 
An almost universal policy response was that these countries left (by choice or per force) 
the course involving inward-looking ISI and started following outward-oriented 
development strategy.  In the process, importance of foreign trade in the level of 
economic activities of these countries has been rising (for a discussion of the ordeal faced 
by the Latin American countries under the neo-liberal strategy, see Adkisson, 1998 and 
2003). 
 
The increased openness was hailed in IMF/World Bank circles. Different World 
Development Reports (World Bank, 1987, 1991, 1999-2000) tried to show that outward-
oriented trade policies have been more successful in promoting growth than inward-
oriented trade policies. Particularly, World Development Report (1987) argued that 
“outward oriented countries” performed better than “inward oriented countries” even 
under unfavourable market conditions. The success stories of East Asian countries (‘East 
Asian Miracle’) were often shown as the success of free trade and export-oriented 
policies. 
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Some scholars, however, questioned the validity of the World Development Reports (see 
for example, Singer, 1987; Singer and Gray, 1988).  Many scholars questioned the 
success stories of East Asian countries as vindication of the neo-liberal paradigm of the 
WC (see for example Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Chang, 1993 and Önis, 1995) and at 
least on one occasion World Bank (1993) conceded.  Nevertheless the transitional 
economies (ex-socialist countries) are advised to follow the WC-type policy 
prescriptions. True to the tradition of institutional economics, many scholars (Adams, 
1987, Adkisson 1998, Atkinson, 1998, Went 2000, Marangos 2001 and Bitzanis and 
Marangos, 2007) are expressing their concern against the neo-liberal paradigm embedded 
in the WC-type policy prescriptions for the less developed countries as well as for the 
transitional economies as the ‘one-size-fit-for-all’ policy ignores history, institutions and 
economic structures of these countries.  Scholars such as Adkisson (1998) observe ‘re-
peripherization’  - bringing back the old centre-periphery division of the world, once 
resented by the Latin American ‘structuralists’ such as Raul Prebisch. 
 
In this perspective we discuss the existing theoretical and empirical evidence in the next 
section and present our findings in the subsequent sections. 
 
2. Existing Literature: Some Selected Works 
 
Some of the ‘new’ endogenous growth theories suggest that trade policy affects long-run 
growth through its impact on technological change. In the models of this tradition (see for 
example Grossman and Helpman, 1992) openness to trade provides access to imported 
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inputs embodying new technology, increases the size of the market faced by the domestic 
producers raising the returns to innovation, and facilitates a country’s specialisation in 
research-intensive production (Harrison, 1996, pp.419-420).  
 
The endogenous growth literature, however, has been  ‘diverse enough to provide a 
different array of models in which trade restrictions can decrease or increase the 
worldwide rate of growth’, as Yanikkaya (2003) rightly points out and refers to the works 
of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a.b) and 
Matsuyama (1992). Increased competition could discourage innovation by lowering 
expected profits. Grossman and Helpman (1992) point out that intervention in trade could 
facilitate long-run growth if protection encourages investment in research-intensive 
sectors. The works of Lucas (1988), Grossman and Helpman (1991 a, b), Young (1991) 
and Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1993) show that even if the trading partners have considerably 
different technologies and endowments, economic integration may adversely affect 
individual countries even if it raises the worldwide growth rate (Yanikkaya 2003, p.59). 
 
Ocampo and Taylor (1998) point out that ‘the preferred defence of trade liberalisation’ as 
found in Krueger (1997) and others, ‘invokes a general equilibrium model with constant 
or decreasing returns to scale’ and the theory of static comparative advantages; against 
that they remind the old infant industry argument which formed the basis of state 
intervention in many countries in the past. They further mention the works of Young 
(1928) and Kaldor (1978) which ‘emphasised how increasing returns and cross firm 
externalities can lead to cumulative growth processes and different patterns of 
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specialisation across economies’ and criticized the neoclassical argument of trade 
intervention based on ‘convexity’ assumption.  
 
In view of the ambiguities in the theoretical literature, a number of empirical studies were 
undertaken to examine the relationship between trade liberalisation and growth. Due to 
the difficulty of measuring openness, different studies have used different measures to 
examine the effects of trade openness on economic growth. Anderson and Neary (1992) 
have developed a ‘trade restrictiveness index’ which tries to incorporate the effects of 
both tariffs and non-tariffs barriers; it is available for a small sample of countries. So 
many cross-country studies used trade shares in GDP and found a positive and strong 
relationship with growth (as reviewed in Harrison, 1996).  
 
 Frankel and Romer (1999) tried to control for endogeneity of trade with the geographical 
variables and found a stronger favourable effect of trade on growth. Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (1999) and Irwin and Tervio (2002) questioned their higher instrument-variable 
(IV) estimates of the impact of trade shares on growth. 
 
A number of studies have looked at the relationship between average tariff rates and 
growth. Lee (1993), Harrison (1996) and Edwards (1998) found a negative relationship 
between the tariff rates and growth.  The studies of Edwards (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997) 
and Clemens and Williamson (2001) concluded that the relationship is weak. Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (1999) tried to replicate the result of Edwards (1998) and found that average 
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tariff rates had a positive and significant relationship with total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth for a sample of 43 countries over the period 1980-1990. 
 
Studies of Harrison (1996), Edwards (1998) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) used black market 
premium (BMP) as a measure of the severity of trade restrictions and reported a 
significant and negative relationship between the BMP and growth. However, Levine and 
Renelt (1992) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) pointed out that the BMP is highly 
correlated with a number of ‘bad’ policies and outcomes such as high inflation, severe 
external debt problems, ineffective law enforcements etc and so using BMP for a measure 
of trade restrictions gives a misleading picture. 
 
Some authors constructed different indices of trade orientation such as openness index by 
Leamer (1988), price distortion and variability index by Dollar (1992) and openness 
index of Sach and Warner (1995) and argued that outward-oriented countries out-
performed inward-oriented countries. These measures of trade barriers are often 
correlated with other sources of poor economic performance, as Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(1999) rightly pointed out. 
 
In a recent study Yanikkaya (2003) used a large number of openness measures for a 
cross-section of countries over the last three decades. His analysis found a significant 
positive correlation between trade shares and growth. However, this study observed that 
different measures of trade barriers are positively associated with growth in the less 
developed countries. 
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In this perspective of confusion and contradiction, our study presented in the next two 
sections seeks to examine the relationship between trade openness and economic growth 
not only at the cross-country level but also at the levels of different regions and   
countries over time since the 1960s. 
 
3. Relationship between Trade Openness and Growth: Panel Data Analysis, 1981-
2002 
 
Increased trade openness is often considered in the sense of an increase in the size of the 
country’s traded sector in relation to total production; it is an acceptable proxy for trade 
liberalisation. In fact increasing trade openness often reflects the success of trade 
liberalisation policies. So we shall use trade (export plus import) as percentage of GDP 
(TRDGDP) as the measure of trade openness. The relevant data are collected from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) published by World Bank. On the basis of availability of 
data we choose a sample of 51 less developed countries (LDCs). The list of countries and 
the relevant data averages (over the period 1981-2002) are presented in Table 1.  
 
The sample of 51 countries is divided into different groups on the basis of the two rules 
of thumb. One is the average share of trade in GDP, TRDGDP, and the other is the 
average GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parity 2000 dollar, PPP 2000 $), 
PCGDPP (over the period 1981-2002). On the basis of TRDGDP 17 countries are 
categorized as Closed Economy (with average TRDGDP < 50 per cent) and 34 countries 
as highly trade-dependent Open Economy countries (with average TRDGDP > or = 50 
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per cent).  On the basis of PCGDPP the countries are further classified as Rich (PCGDPP 
> $5000) – 16 countries belong to this group (countries belonging to this group are 
marked by an asterisk, ‘*’) and Poor (other 35 countries). 
 
We have considered three alternative models between the rate of growth of real GDP per 
capita (PCGDPG) and trade openness index (TRDGDP): between-effects model (BE), 
the country-fixed effect model (FE) and the random-effect model (RE).  
 
The BE model is equivalent to taking the average (mean) of each variable for each 
country across time and running a regression on the data set of averages (for a sample of 
51 countries 51 observations of TRDGDP and PCGDPG). This averaging procedure 
results in loss of information (one observation per country rather than 22 observations per 
country over the period 1981-2002). Nevertheless we have estimated this BE model and 
observed that across the countries, the higher the TRDGDP, the higher is the growth rate 
(both averaged over the period, 1981-2002). But if we use dummies for different groups 
as defined above – rich and poor or closed and open, we get no significant impact of 
these factors (Table 2). 
 
Keeping in mind this result we consider two other models: FE and BE. The FE is 
designed to control for omitted variables that differ across countries but are constant over 
time. This is equivalent to generating dummy variables for each country-cases and 
including them in a standard linear regression to control for these fixed country-effects.  
The RE is used if there is a reason to believe that some omitted variables may be constant 
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over time but vary between cases, and others may be fixed between cases but vary over 
time.  The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (LM) has been done to choose the 
appropriate model. It strongly supports the RE model in all the cases.  That means the 
standard regression analysis with country dummies (the FE model) is not appropriate  
(the residual variance across the countries is not zero in the panel regression). 
 
The estimates show that the positive relationship between trade openness and growth at 
the cross-country average level (the BE model) holds good also in our panel data analysis 
over the period 1981-2002 across the same sample of 51 countries. None of the 
coefficients of intercept and slope dummies for ‘rich’ and ‘open’ economies are 
significant.  As an initial condition, we have considered the log of GDP per capita, 1981 
(measured in purchasing power parity 2000 dollar) in the panel regression (It is often 
used in the literature following the tradition of so-called ‘Barro’ regression of examining 
the old Veblen (1915)-Gerschenkron (1952) convergence hypothesis in the new context 
of convergence implication of the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth theory vis-à-vis the 
divergence implication of the new growth theory –for details see Sarkar 2000).    It has no 
effect implying that there is no sign of convergence (the higher the initial per capita GDP, 
the lower is the growth rate of per capita GDP) of the standard of living across the 
countries (this is true for the both BE and RE models).  
 
 Running separate panel regressions for the groups of 16 ‘rich’ countries and 35 ‘poor’ 
countries we find that the positive relationship between openness and growth holds for 
the ‘rich’ group. But following the same procedure for the groups of 34 ‘open’ and 17 
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‘closed’ countries, we find the positive relationship only for the ‘open’ group. Finally we 
run a panel regression for the 11 countries belonging to both the groups, ‘open’ and 
‘rich’. In this group we get a significant positive relationship between openness and 
growth.  There is also a strong evidence of convergence.  
 
For the remaining 40 countries (neither ‘open’ nor ‘rich’) we get neither a relationship 
between growth and openness nor an evidence of convergence or divergence. 
 
4. Relationship between Trade Openness and Growth:  Time Series Study of 
Individual Country Experiences, 1961-2002 
 
The utility of cross-section studies lies in the fact that the lack of enough observations per 
country can be overcome by increasing the number of countries in the study – even one 
single observation of a country can be utilised.  But it is often doubtful how far it gives a 
causal relationship among the variables under study. Moreover a cross-section panel 
regression analysis often tries to include as many countries as possible – some studies 
cover (say) 60 countries, some covers 80 countries and all the countries covered in the 
study are implicitly given the same weight (it is also difficult to devise a weighting 
system). It is difficult to justify how far one can treat a country such as Papua New 
Guinea or Ghana at par with a country such as Brazil or India. There always remains a 
scope for proving or disproving anything through a suitable choice of sample.   
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It is also doubtful how far a general result based on a cross-section study can be used to 
provide a policy prescription for a particular country.  In this respect time-series analysis 
gives better insight since it deals with individual country cases.  When enough data are 
available for a single country it is better to carry forward a case study. But we conducted 
the above panel regression analysis in the tradition of the existing literature, which 
provides strong support for growth-promoting effects of different kinds of trade and 
financial liberalisation. For the relationship between trade openness and growth our study 
finds a positive relationship in a group of 11 highly open and rich countries.  In the 
following time-series analysis we shall examine the individual country cases to examine 
whether there exists a meaningful relationship between growth and trade openness over a 
long period, 1961-2002 (in some cases shorter periods are considered due to non-
availability of data).  
 
The study of long-run relationships between two time-series variables require a test of 
unit root – the test for the integration of the series - how many times the series are to be 
differenced to attain the stationarity property needed to carry forward a meaningful (as 
against spurious) regression analysis (the residuals of the regression are to be stationary 
to apply the standard t-tests of significance).  Once Nelson and Plosser (1982) argued that 
all the macroeconomic variables have unit root – they are long-memory series. In simple 
language this observation implies that a temporary shock has a permanent effect (an 
econometric counterpart of the so-called real business cycle models of the ‘modern’ 
macroeconomics). The standard regression analysis is usually based on the assumption 
that the series are short-memory series – a temporary shock creates a transitory deviation 
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from the path of the series. So instead of using the standard regression analysis one has to 
use cointegration approach. Subsequently the observation of Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
was questioned but it became a standard practice to conduct unit root tests before 
conducting any analysis of relationship between two variables. 
 
But the problem is that different tests of unit root often give different results and the 
lower the length of the series the lower is the power of the standard tests. The 
Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran 
and Shin (1999) does not require such pre-testing and ‘data-mining’. This technique can 
be used to test for the existence of a long run relationship between two variables 
irrespective of whether they are stationary or not (having unit root or not). We shall use 
Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran 
and Shin (1999) to ascertain the existence of a long run equilibrium relationship between 
trade openness and growth. This approach does not require any pre-testing of the 
variables to determine the order of their integration (how many times the data are to be 
differenced to achieve the stationarity property of the data).   
 
In the ARDL approach the following equation is fitted: 
                                                                                         p              q                                   
(1)                                                                    Yt = a + Σ  bi Yt-i + Σ cj Xt-j                                            
                                                                                      i = 1         j = 0  
 
where Yt is the  growth rate of real GDP  per capita (PCGDPG) in period t, Xt is the trade 
openness index – share of total trade in  GDP (TRDGDP) in period t and p, q are 
unknown lags to be determined by various criteria.  
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 We have used four alternative criteria for choosing the values of the lags (p and q) of the 
ARDL (p, q) model: R Bar Square Criterion (RBSQ), Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) and Hannan-Quinn (H-Q) criterion. The 
estimates of the long-term coefficient of TRDGDP are reported in Table 3. 
 
First we consider the long-term relationship for different regions and groups for which 
WDI data are available: Low Income, Middle Income, High Income non-OECD 
countries, Least Developed Countries, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and World. Only for the 
group, Middle Income, we observe a clear positive long-term relationship between trade 
openness and growth. For all other categories and for the World as a whole we observe 
no relationship of statistical significance. 
 
Next we consider the individual country experiences. There is some confusion as the 
different criteria of choosing the ARDL models in many cases give different lag 
structures and conclusion varies accordingly. If we rely on the SBC criterion as 
recommended by Pesaran and Shin (1999), we get statistically significant positive long-
term relationships between growth and trade openness for twelve countries (Algeria*, 
Botswana*, Burkina Faso, Chile*, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leon and Trinidad* - ‘rich’ countries are marked by *) and negative 
relationship for nine countries (Argentina*, Bolivia, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
India, Indonesia, Korea* and Tunisia -‘rich’ countries are marked by *). 
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 Uses of other criteria will add four more countries (Malawi, Panama*, Singapore* and 
Uruguay*) to the list of positive relationship and one country (Gabon*) to the list of 
negative relationship. So altogether there are sixteen cases which some way or other 
favour the hypothesis of positive relationship between trade openness and growth and 
seven of them (marked by *) belong to the category, ‘rich’. There are ten cases of 
negative relationship and three of them (marked by *) belong to the category, ‘rich’.  
 
There are only six clear cases (Algeria, Chile, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Nigeria and 
Trinidad) where the statistically significant positive relationship can be found in all the 
four ARDL models. Out of these six, only two countries (Chile and Trinidad) belong to 
the group (of 11) ‘open’ economy ‘rich’ countries for which the panel data analysis has 
observed a positive relationship between openness and growth. 
 
There are six clear cases (Argentina, Cote d’Ivoire, India, El Salvador, Korea and 
Tunisia) of negative relationship. The negative relationship for Korea is, however, a 
manifestation of the 1997 crisis. By adding intercept and time-slope dummies to the 
ARDL equation (1) it can be seen that there is no relationship between trade openness 
and growth for Korea.  Including Korea there are 26 clear cases of no relationship. 
Thailand and Malaysia also belong to this category (even if we take into account the 1997 
crisis by using dummies). Taking negative relationship as evidence against the positive 
relationship we get 35 clear cases against the hypothesis of positive relationship.  Use of 
the SBC criterion for choosing the lag structure of the ARDL equation will put the 
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number as 39.  There is no clear picture. A large number of LDCs experienced no long-
term positive relationship between trade share and growth irrespective of whether they 
are highly trade-dependent or not and poor or rich.  
 
5. Concluding Observations 
 
The present study examines the relationship between trade liberalisation/trade openness 
and real growth rates. The share of total trade (exports plus imports) in GDP (trade-share) 
is taken as the measure of trade openness. Data on trade-shares and growth rates in GDP 
per capita are collected from World Bank data on World Development Indicators. For our 
cross-country study of averages and panel regression analysis we have considered the 
relevant data for a sample of 51 less-developed countries (LDCs) over a uniform time 
period 1981-2002. Like many other works in this field, our study shows that a country 
with a higher trade share tends to experience a higher real growth. For further 
investigation of this result, we have divided the sample into various overlapping groups 
on the basis of  (1981-2002) average GDP per capita (2000 $ PPP) and trade shares – 
‘rich’ and ‘poor’ and ‘open’ and ‘closed’. Running separate regressions for all these 
groups shows that for only 11 rich and highly trade-dependent LDCs a higher real growth 
is associated with a higher trade share.  
 
Furthermore we resort to time series study of individual country experiences. We do not 
have a fully specified model of growth with all the major variables affecting growth of 
the individual LDCs. Rather we try to estimate the gross relationship between trade share 
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and growth by relating the present real growth rate of individual LDCs with its past 
values and the present and past values of trade shares under the ARDL approach to co-
integration. We expect this study to provide the first hand information. The 
comparatively new ARDL approach frees the study of long-term relationship from the 
clutches of pre-testing the stationarity property of the variables.  
 
Our time series study of individual country experiences shows that the majority of LDCs 
including the East Asian countries experienced no positive long-term relationship 
between openness and growth during 1961-2002. Extending this study to cover various 
regions and groups shows that only the Middle Income group experienced a positive 
long-term relationship. This casts serious doubt on one aspect of neo-liberal paradigm of 
the Washington Consensus (WC) – the policy of trade-openness to promote growth (for 
evidence against other aspects, see Sarkar, 2007a, b). The ever-increasing body of 
literature in the ‘mainstream’ journals, however, continues to provide strong (?) empirical 
evidence in favor of WC. It actually reflects the general editorial bias in favour of WC- 
the works producing the contrary evidence are often summarily rejected without proper 
refereeing (these editors often calculate the probability of success of a paper depending 
on its conclusion presented in the abstract and rejects anti-WC paper without wasting 
time and money for refereeing). Thus a ‘mainstream’ academic consensus is being built 
in favor of WC. This paper questions this ‘mainstream’ consensus and supports the 
heterodox position. 
. 
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Table 1.Trade Openness, GDP Per Capita and Its Growth Rate, 1981-2002:  
Selected Southern Countries 
  
Groups/Countries PCGDPP1 
(1981) 
PCGDPP1 
(1981-2002 
averages) 
PCGDPG2 
(1981-2002 
averages) 
 
TRDGDP3 
(1981-2002 
averages) 
CLOSEDECONOMY4     
Argentina* 10804 10941 -0.38 19 
Bangladesh 1065 1266 2.15 24 
Bolivia 2272 2242 -0.22 48 
Brazil* 6413 6794 0.47 19 
Burkina Faso 813 925 1.4 36 
Cameroon 2396 2091 0.01 49 
Guatemala 3962 3647 -0.1 40 
Haiti 2985 2243 -2.71 41 
India 1229 1807 3.55 19 
Madagascar 1009 884 -2.01 43 
Mexico* 8304 7934 0.63 43 
Pakistan 1121 1599 2.25 35 
Peru 5522 4700 -0.14 32 
Rwanda 1339 1162 0.1 31 
Sierra Leon 1056 808 -3.13 43 
Uruguay* 7512 7695 0.16 41 
Venezuela* 6504 5955 -1.23 48 
OPEN ECONOMY4     
Algeria* 5528 5532 -0.01 51 
Botswana* 2793 5557 4.69 104 
Chile* 4825 6757 3.41 57 
Congo 840 968 0.13 113 
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Costa Rica* 6904 7120 1.16 79 
Cote d’Ivoire 2220 1763 -1.76 70 
Dominican Republic 3964 4683 2.28 71 
Ecuador 3415 3385 0.00 55 
Egypt 2335 2974 2.49 51 
El Salvador 3772 4016 0.59 54 
Fiji 4704 4637 0.77 110 
Gabon* 7026 6258 -0.72 92 
Gambia 1724 1699 -0.28 113 
Ghana 1681 1703 0.57 54 
Honduras 2628 2518 -0.12 75 
Indonesia 1536 2445 3.55 55 
Jamaica 3288 3583 0.7 99 
Jordan 4307 4196 -0.21 120 
Kenya 1049 1051 -0.19 60 
Korea* 4798 10282 6.19 65 
Malawi 552 550 0.03 60 
Malaysia* 4217 6430 3.52 157 
Mauritius* 4256 7017 4.59 120 
Nigeria 840 829 -0.83 64 
Panama* 5640 5327 1.25 156 
Paraguay 5082 4727 -0.41 62 
Philippines 4207 3845 0.21 72 
Senegal 1325 1405 0.58 66 
Singapore* 10163 16206 4.29 290 
Sri Lanka 1826 2578 3.15 73 
Thailand 2602 4805 4.7 79 
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Trinidad & Tobago* 9571 7832 -0.05 83 
Tunisia 4211 4998 2.1 86 
Zimbabwe 2726 2639 -0.58 57 
 
* ‘Rich’ countries with 1981-2002 average per capita GDP > $5000 (internationally comparable purchasing 
power parity 2000 dollar). 
 
1 PCGDPP = Per capita GDP in purchasing power parity constant (2000) international US $; 
 
2 PCGDPG = Growth in real GDP per capita; 
 
3 TRDGDP = Trade (exports plus imports) as percentage of GDP, Trade openness index; 
 
4 Countries are categorised as ‘Closed Economy’ if their Trade (Exports + Imports) as a percentage 
of GDP, TRDGDP (1981-2002 average) < 50 per cent. All others are considered as Open Economy 
countries. 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, available on-line. 
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Table 2. Trade Openness and Growth of the Southern Countries,  
1981-2002:  Panel Data Analysis1 
 
 
Regressors 
 
I II III IV V VI VII 
I. Cross-
country BE 
Model 
       
Whole Sample 
(51 countries) 
       
a (intercept) -0.13 -0.41 -0.48 -0.33 -0.22 0.53 3.18 
TRDGDP 0.01* 0.01* 0.006 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.09 
LPCY81  0.04      
Intercept 
Dummy-rich 
(Dr) 
  1.01  0.88 -0.24  
Slope Dummy-
rich (SDr) 
     0.02  
Intercept 
Dummy-
openness (Dt) 
  0.94 0.76   -2.96 
Slope Dummy-
openness (SDt) 
      0.1* 
R Sq. 0.11  0.18 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.22 
F-stat. 6.12  3.54 3.72 4.24 3.28 4.35 
II. Panel Data 
RE Model 
       
Whole Sample 
(51 countries) 
       
a (intercept) -0.61 0.03 -0.05 -1.08 -6.9 -0.72 -0.83 
TRDGDP 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.03 0.02** 0.02** 0.02 
LPCY81  -0.08      
Intercept 
Dummy-rich 
(Dr) 
  0.27   0.66 0.69 
Slope Dummy-
rich (SDr) 
  0.01     
Intercept 
Dummy-
openness (Dt) 
   -0.01 0.23  0.31 
Slope Dummy-
openness (SDt) 
   -1.08    
R Sq. 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
LM-stat. 2 175.73 175.73 149.03 140.78 165.63 158.03 143.8 
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Rich (16 
countries) 3 
       
a (intercept) -0.32 31.27      
TRDGDP 0.02** 0.02**      
LPCY81  -3.57      
R Sq. 0.06 0.13      
LM-stat. 66.3 16.35      
Poor (35 
countries) 3 
       
a (intercept) -0.45 0.65      
TRDGDP 0.02 0.02*      
LPCY81  -0.15      
R Sq. 0.002 0.002      
LM-stat. 2 84.06 84.17      
Open (34 
countries) 4 
       
a (intercept) 0.49 -1.49      
TRDGDP 0.02** 0.02**      
LPCY81  0.13      
R Sq. 0.03 0.03      
LM-stat. 2 176.42 170.48      
Closed (17 
countries) 4 
       
a (intercept) -0.22 2.46      
TRDGDP 0.007 0.007      
LPCY81  -0.34      
R Sq. 0.004 0.001      
LM-stat. 2 10.1 8.61      
Open & Rich 
(11 countries)  
       
a (intercept) -0.16 39.51      
TRDGDP 0.02** 0.03**      
LPCY81  -4.63**      
R Sq. 0.03 0.12      
LM-stat. 2 86.38 27.62      
Others (40 
countries)  
       
a (intercept) -0.41 0.56      
TRDGDP 0.01 0.01      
LPCY81  -0.12      
R Sq. 0.002 0.003      
LM-stat. 2 66.54 65.86      
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 * Significant at 5 per cent level  
**  Significant at 1 per cent level. 
 
1     The following equation is fitted: 
   Growth of Per Capita GDP (PCGDPG)  
 = a + b. TRDGDP + c log (PCY91) +  d.D + e.SD 
where D is intercept dummy – it is either Dr  [ = 1 for 16 ‘rich’ countries with 1981-2002 
average GDP  per capita > $ 5000 (purchasing power parity dollar) and = 0 otherwise] or 
Dt  [= 1 for 34 highly trade-dependent ‘open’ countries with 1981-2002 average trade 
share (TRDGDP) > 50 per cent  and = 0 otherwise] and SDr =Dr.TRDGDP and SDt = 
Dt.TRDGDP are the slope dummies. 
Setting one or more parameters (c to e) equal to zero, we have fitted alternative   
regression equations.  
 
2 The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic is reported here. It 
supports the random-effect model (RE) model in every case. 
 
3      ‘Rich’: Countries with 1981-2002 average per capita GDP > $5000 (internationally      
comparable purchasing power parity 2000 dollar). ‘Poor’: Others 
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4   Countries are categorised as ‘Closed Economy’ if their Trade (Exports + 
Imports) as a percentage of GDP, TRDGDP (1981-2002 average) < 50 per cent. All 
others are considered as Open Economy countries. 
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Table 3.Long-term Relationship between Real Growth Rate and Trade Openness,  
1961-2002: Estimates through  the ARDL Method1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-: Criteria (ARDL Model in Parentheses): - 
  
R-Bar Sq AIC SBC H-Q 
 
Regions & Groups  
WORLD 0.22 
(12,12) 
0.22 
(12,12) 
0.22 
(12,12) 
0.22 
(12,12)  
EAST ASIA & THE 
PACIFIC2, 3 
-0.17 
(6,8) 
-0.05 
(9,9) 
-0.03 
(1,0) 
-0.17 
(6,8)  
LATIN AMERICA & THE 
CARIBBEAN  
0.03 
(11,11) 
0.03 
(11,11) 
0.02 
(1,0) 
0.03 
(11,11)  
MIDDLE EAST & 
NORTH AFRICA4 
-0.04 
(3,8) 
-0.04 
(3,8) 
-0.04 
(3,8) 
-0.04 
(3,8)  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA -0.14 
(10,12) 
0.36 
(12,12) 
0.36 
(12,12) 
0.36 
(12,12)  
LOW INCOME -0.07 
(0,0) 
-0.07 
(0,0) 
-0.07 
(0,0) 
-0.07 
(0,0)  
MIDDLE INCOME 0.15** 
(9,9) 
0.15** 
(9,9) 
0.15** 
(9,9) 
0.15** 
(9,9)  
HIGH INCOME NON-
OECD GROUP 
0.03 
(0,1) 
0.03 
(0,1) 
0.03 
(0,1) 
0.03 
(0,1)  
LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES5 
1.26 
(5,1) 
-0.43 
(6,6) 
1.26 
(5,1) 
-0.43 
(6,6)  
Countries  
ALGERIAR 0.11* 
(12,11) 
0.07 
(8,0) 
0.11 
(1,0) 
0.07 
(8,0)  
ARGENTINAR, C -0.74** 
(0,0) 
-0.74** 
(0,0) 
-0.74** 
(0,0) 
-0.74** 
(0,0)  
BANGLADESH C -0.02 
(12,11) 
-0.02 
(12,11) 
-0.02 
(12,11) 
-0.02 
(12,11)  
BOLIVIA2 C -0.47 
(5,9) 
-0.02 
(12,11) 
-0.92* 
(0,9) 
-0.02 
(12,11)  
BOTSWANAR 0.15 
(11,12) 
0.15 
(11,12) 
0.22* 
(2,0) 
0.15 
(11,12)  
BRAZILR  C -0.6 
(0,10) 
-0.48 
(12,11) 
0.17 
(0,0) 
-0.48 
(12,11)  
BURKINA FASO C 0.06* 
(10,11) 
0.04* 
(12,12) 
0.04* 
(12,12) 
0.04* 
(12,12)  
CAMEROON6 C  -0.43 
(11,5) 
2.45 
(11,11) 
-0.18 
(7,5) 
2.45 
(11,11)  
CHILER 2.16* 
(11,12) 
2.16* 
(11,12) 
2.16* 
(11,12) 
2.16* 
(11,12)  
CONGO 0.26 
(4,10) 
0.26 
(4,10) 
0.26 
(4,10) 
0.26 
(4,10)  
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COSTA RICAR 0.12 
(12,12) 
0.12 
(12,12) 
0.12 
(12,12) 
0.12 
(12,12)  
COTE D’IVOIRE -0.36* 
(0,6) 
-0.36* 
(0,6) 
-0.36* 
(0,6) 
-0.36* 
(0,6)  
 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
0.47* 
(11,12) 
0.49** 
(12,12) 
0.47* 
(11,12) 
0.47* 
(11,12)  
ECUADOR -0.99* 
(7,9) 
-2.92 
(12,11) 
-0.99* 
(7,9) 
-0.99* 
(7,9)  
EGYPT 0.31 
(12,12) 
0.31 
(12,12) 
0.31 
(12,12) 
0.31 
(12,12)  
EL SALVADOR -0.17** 
(8,9) 
-0.23* 
(12,12) 
-0.23* 
(2,5) 
-0.17** 
(8,9)  
FIJI 0.34** 
(11,12) 
0.34** 
(12,12) 
0.34** 
(12,12) 
0.34** 
(12,12)  
GABONR -1.25** 
(4,10) 
-1.25** 
(4,10) 
-0.23 
(0,0) 
-1.25** 
(4,10)  
GAMBIA7 -0.08 
(8,8) 
-0.07 
(10,8) 
-0.01 
(0,0) 
-0.07 
(10,8)  
GHANA -0.21 
(9,9) 
0.07 
(12,12) 
0.02 
(0,0) 
-0.21 
(9,7)  
GUATEMALA C  
4.16 
(11,12) 
 
4.16 
(11,12) 
 
0.2** 
(1,1) 
4.16 
(11,12) 
  
HAITI C 0.05 
(8,12) 
-0.01 
(12,12) 
0.26** 
(0,0) 
-0.01 
(12,12)  
HONDURAS 0.11 
(11,11) 
0.11 
(11,11) 
0.11 
(11,11) 
0.11 
(11,11)  
INDIA C -0.13** 
(6,0) 
-0.13** 
(6,0) 
-0.16** 
(4,0) 
-0.13** 
(6,0)  
INDONESIA -0.24** 
(2,1) 
-1.65 
(12,12) 
-0.29** 
(0,0) 
-1.65 
(12,12)  
JAMAICA 0.14 
(12,12) 
0.14 
(12,12) 
0.14 
(12,12) 
0.14 
(12,12)  
JORDON8 -0.13 
(6,6) 
-0.42 
(7,7) 
-0.42 
(7,7) 
-0.42 
(7,7)  
KENYA -19.15 
(10,12) 
-19.15 
(10,12) 
0.01 
(4,0) 
-19.15 
(10,12)  
KOREAR ,3 -0.14** 
(10,12) 
-0.14** 
(10,12) 
-0.14** 
(10,12) 
-0.14** 
(10,12)  
MADAGASCAR C 0.01 
(2,3) 
-0.09 
(12,12) 
0.01 
(2,3) 
0.01 
(2,3)  
MALAWI 0.21 
(11,9) 
 
0.12* 
(12,12) 
0.04 
(0,2) 
0.12* 
(12,12) 
 
MALAYSIAR, 3 0.0005 
(12,11) 
-0.0002 
(12,12) 
-0.0002 
(12,12) 
-0.0002 
(12,12)  
MAURITIUSR 9 0.42 
(6,4) 
0.08 
(6,6) 
0.08 
(6,6) 
0.08 
(6,6)  
MEXICOR C 0.66 
(11,12) 
0.66 
(11,12) 
0.66 
(11,12) 
0.66 
(11,12)  
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NIGERIA 0.79** 
(10,12) 
0.7** 
(12,12) 
0.79** 
(10,12) 
0.79** 
(10,12)  
PAKISTAN7 C 3.13 
(8,10) 
4.28 
(9,10) 
4.28 
(9,10) 
4.28 
(9,10)  
PANAMAR 10 0.06* 
(3,0) 
0.15 
(6,6) 
0.15 
(6,6) 
0.15 
(6,6)  
PARAGUAY -2.39 
(4,12) 
-0.14 
(12,12) 
0.13 
(1,0) 
0.08 
(2,0)  
PERU C 0.05 
(12,12) 
0.05 
(12,12) 
0.05 
(12,12) 
0.05 
(12,12)  
PHILIPPINES -0.09 
(9,11) 
-0.04 
(11,11) 
-0.09 
(9,11) 
-0.09 
(9,11)  
RWANDA C 1.07 
(11,11) 
1.35 
(12,12) 
0.46* 
(0,2) 
1.35 
(12,12)  
SENEGAL -0.003 
(12,12) 
-0.003 
(12,12) 
-0.003 
(12,12) 
-0.003 
(12,12)  
SIERRA LEON11 C -0.13** 
(10,5) 
-0.27** 
(10,11) 
0.21* 
(1,0) 
-0.27** 
(10,11)  
SINGAPORER 0.07* 
(12,7) 
-3.92 
(11,12) 
-3.92 
(11,12) 
-3.92 
(11,12)  
SRI LANKA 0.55 
(11,12) 
0.55 
(11,12) 
0.55 
(11,12) 
0.55 
(11,12)  
THAILAND3 -0.02 
(12,12) 
-0.02 
(12,12) 
-0.02 
(12,12) 
-0.02 
(12,12)  
TRINIDADR 0.24* 
(8,12) 
0.24* 
(8,12) 
0.24* 
(8,12) 
0.24* 
(8,12)  
 
TUNISIA 
 
 
-0.49* 
(12,12) 
 
-0.49* 
(12,12) 
 
-0.49* 
(12,12) 
 
-0.49* 
(12,12)  
URUGUAYR C 0.54* 
(9,12) 
0.81 
(11,11) 
0.81 
(11,11) 
0.81 
(11,11)  
VENEZUELAR C 0.99 
(12,12) 
0.99 
(12,12) 
0.99 
(12,12) 
0.99 
(12,12)  
ZIMBABWE4 -0.07 
(6,8) 
-0.02 
(8,8) 
0.02 
(8,8) 
0.02 
(8,8)  
 
R ‘Rich’ countries with PCGDPP (GDP per capita in purchasing power parity 2000 dollar – average  
over the period 1981-2002) > $5000.  
 
C  ‘Closed Economy’ countries with Trade (Exports + Imports) as a percentage of GDP, TRDGDP  
(1981-2002 average) < 50 per cent. All others are considered as highly trade-dependent Open Economy 
countries. 
  
**  Significant at 1 per cent level (based on asymptotic standard errors). 
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*    Significant at 5 per cent level (based on asymptotic standard errors). 
 
1 The following ARDL (p, q) model is fitted:  
                                                                                    
                                               p                q              
                                                                 Gt = a + b.t +  Σ  bi Gt-i + Σ cj Tt-j    
                                                                                     i = 1          j = 0                          
 
where G is the growth rate of real GDP per capita (PCGDPG), T is TRDGDP, the subscripts t, t-i and t-j 
indicate different time periods and p and q are unknown lags to be determined by various criteria. 
 
We have used four alternative criteria: R Bar Square Criterion (RBSQ), Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) and Hannan-Quinn (H-Q) criterion. The estimates of the long-
term coefficients are obtained with the aid of Microfit program and reported here with the chosen ARDL 
model (p, q) in parentheses.  
 
2 Period of study is 1970-2002. 
 
3 For Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and East Asia & the Pacific, we have added intercept dummy (D) 
and slope dummy (SD = D.t) for the period 1998-2002. This procedure changes the conclusion for Korea 
from a negatively significant relationship to no relationship of statistical significance. For others the 
conclusion of no relationship remains unaltered. 
 
4 Period of study is 1975-2002. 
 
5 This is an UN category. 
 
6 Period of study is 1965-2002. 
 
7 Period of study is 1967-2002. 
 
8 Period of study is 1976-2002. 
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 9 Period of study is 1981-2002. 
 
10 Period of study is 1980-2002. 
 
11 Period of study is 1964-2002. 
 
 
 
 39
